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In online contents markets, content providers collect revenues from both
consumers and advertisers by segmenting consumers who are willing to avoid
advertisements and who are not. To analyze such situations, I construct a
model of menu pricing by advertising platforms in two-sided markets. I find
that, under certain condition, although a monopolistic platform can choose
any menu of price-advertisement pairs, the optimal menu consists of only
two services: ad-supported basic service and ad-free premium service. In
addition, if the willingness to pay of advertisers is sufficiently high, the basic
service is offered for free. This menu pricing is well known as freemium. Fur-
thermore, this binary structure remains to hold an equilibrium menu pricing
even under duopoly.
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1. Introduction
Freemium is a business model which is coined as a combination of the words free and
premium. This word describes “a business model in which you give a core product away
for free to a large group of users and sell premium products to a smaller fraction of this
user base.1" The purpose of this paper is to show that this business model is optimal menu
pricing for advertising platforms under certain conditions.
There are many instances of freemium in digital economy. As in Table 1, fair amount of
majormusic- and video-streaming services adopt freemium businessmodels. A prominent
example of freemium business is Spotify, a music-streaming service with the largest
∗I thank Toshihiro Matsumura for advice and support. I am also grateful to Satoshi Kasamatsu, Daiki
Kishishita, Hiroshi Ohashi, Dan Sasaki, Yusuke Zennyo, and seminar participants at Nanzan University
and Ristumeikan University for beneficial comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are my own.
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors
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1Freemium.org “What is Freemium?": http://www.freemium.org/what-is-freemium-2/
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Service Business Model
Spotify Freemium
Apple Music Subscription
Pandora Freemium
Rhapsody Subscription
Tidal Subscription
Deezer Freemium
Music-streaming services
Service Business Model
YouTube Freemium
Netflix Subscription
Hulu Subscription
Bing Videos Ad-supported
Vimeo Freemium
Daily Motion Ad-supported
Video-streaming services
Table 1: Business models of major streaming services. Ad-supported business model
offers free services to consumers and collect revenues from advertisers. Sub-
scription business model offers paid services to consumers. The classification of
business models is by my own.
market share in the world. Spotify offers two services, Free and Premium. In Free
service, customers can shuﬄe several given playlists, with advertising audios interrupting
in the time between songs. Customers who pay a monthly fee of $9.99 to subscribe
Premium service can play any songswith better sound quality, create their original playlists,
download musics, and listen oﬄine, without being interrupted by advertisements. As
another example of freemium, YouTube, a well-known ad-supported video-streaming
platform, recently started to offer a paid and ad-free membership service, called YouTube
Red. YouTube Red also has several additional functionalities such as saving videos
on mobile devices or viewing original contents. Users of YouTube who want to avoid
advertisements or get richer functionalities can upgrade their accounts to YouTube Red.
This type of businessmodels can be seen as a class of second-degree price discrimination
since the firm offers a menu of services (free and premium) and lets customers choose
between them. A distinctive feature of this business model is that it uses the amount of
advertisements as an instrument to screen customers.2 Customers can choose ad-supported
free service or ad-free premium service according to their nuisance from advertisements,
and advertisers can show their advertisements only to free customers. Put differently,
this is a price discrimination by a two-sided platform using the levels of interactions
between agents on both sides as an instrument to price-discriminate.3 This form of price
discrimination is relatively new and thus have been subject to few research until recently.
There is a tradeoff when the platform uses the levels of interactions as instruments to
price-discriminate. Consumers who want to enjoy contents without being annoyed by
advertisements are willing to pay more to reduce the amount of advertisements. Thus,
the platform can collect revenues from consumers by introducing a service with a fewer
amount of advertisements and charging a higher fee. However, while offering a service
with fewer advertisement may successfully collect revenues from consumers, this reduces
2There is another instrument of price discrimination and another form of freemium business model where
free service and premium service differ in their intrinsic functionalities. Under this kind of business
model, customers choose services according to their preference on the functionalities. This kind of
freemium businesses include online applications (e.g., Evernote), publishers (IDES), massive open
online courses (Coursera), and so on. As mentioned in Section 1.1, this kind of business models can be
treated as versioning.
3For a brief review of the economics of two-sided markets, see Rysman (2009).
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the revenue from advertisers as the total view of advertisements shrinks. Thus, the platform
needs to take this tradeoff into account when they decide how to price-discriminate.
Treating freemium as a price discrimination by two-sided platforms, several questions
arise;What is the optimal price discrimination for platforms? Is the freemiumoptimal price
discrimination? Since platforms can potentially consider any nonlinear advertisement-
price path to maximize its profit, and freemium is just one special class of such a price
discrimination, it is natural to think that there would be better ways to collect revenues
for the platforms. On the flip side of the coin, for freemium to be optimal, this must be
superior to any other candidate menus platforms can design.
To answer these questions, I construct a model of menu pricing problem of advertising
platforms in two-sided markets where consumers are annoyed by advertisements and
advertisers benefit from listing advertisements. The platform potentially can offer any
menu of services which specify the pairs of amount of advertisements and fixed fees.
My main result (Proposition 2.1) shows that the optimal menu pricing should be binary
under certain conditions. More precisely, I show that, under the linear specification, which
is commonly adopted in the literature of advertising platforms, the monopolistic platform
optimally offers only two services: basic service with full advertisements and premium
service with no advertisements. This menu pricing segments consumers into two groups:
those who contribute to the platform’s revenue by paying premium fees and those who
contribute by viewing advertisements, leaving no intermediate segment of consumers. In
fact, this simple segmentation is optimal when consumer nuisance from advertisements is
linear, and the platform successfully collect revenues from both consumers and advertisers.
Furthermore, if the advertisers’ benefit from transaction is sufficiently high relative to the
intrinsic value of the platform’s service, then the basic service becomes free (Proposition
2.2). In this case, the optimal menu is literally freemium.
Then, I analyze several properties of optimal menu pricing. First, I examine welfare
properties of binary menu pricing. I show that profit-maximizing price for advertisers
is too high and the amount of consumers who view advertisements is too small in terms
of social welfare (Proposition 2.3). As a result, the size of advertising network is too
small relative to the social optimum. Next, I compare the binary menu with another
business model called ad-supported business model. I find that, the platform provides
more advertisers and less consumers who view advertisements under the binary menu
pricing (Proposition 2.3). This difference stems from the difference in the appropriability
of surplus from consumers who avoids advertisements. Under ad-supported business
model, these consumers do not participate in the platform, and the platform collects no
revenues . On the other hand, a platform which adopts binary menu can collect revenues
from these consumers by providing ad-free services. This generates the incentive toward
reducing (increasing) the amount of consumers who view (do not view) advertisements.
This in turn reduces the average nuisance of consumers who view advertisements, and
thus platform increases the amount of advertisers.
I also examinewhether the binary structure remains to be valid under different situations.
The property that platforms offer only two services remains to be valid under a duopoly
situation (Proposition 3.1). In addition, if the advertisers’ benefit from transaction is
sufficiently high relative to the degree of product differentiation (or transportation cost) of
the platform’s service, then the basic services become free In this sense, my main result
that freemium is an equilibrium, is robust to the competition.
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In summary, the results in my paper provide economic foundations for the prevalence
of freemium business models; once we accept the linear environment, offering only two
free and premium services is actually the best strategy for platforms among a number of
alternatives.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next subsection, I review the related
literature. Section 2 presents a model of menu pricing by a monopoly platform and main
results. Section 3 presents a doupoly extension, and Section 4 concludes.
1.1. Related Literature
There are three groups of research related to my paper: literature on price discrimination,
two-sided markets, and freemium.
Price Discrimination There is a huge literature on second-degree price discrimination
(e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984)). Papers related to my model
are those which focus on the optimality of price discrimination, or versioning (e.g., Salant
(1989), Deneckere and McAfee (1996), Varian (1997), Jing (2007), and Anderson and
Dana (2009)).
Salant (1989) examines the condition under which second-degree price discrimination
is suboptimal, and Deneckere and McAfee (1996) examine the profitability of price dis-
crimination through the introduction of “damaged goods". These analyses are further
developed by Varian (1997) and Anderson and Dana (2009). A common finding in these
papers is that, if consumer preference and production cost are linear in quality, inducing
self-selection through price discrimination will never be optimal. Intuition behind this
result is that, when consumer preference and quality cost is linear in quality, marginal
profit of increasing the quality for each consumer is constant and it is optimal to increase
the quality as long as possible if the marginal profit is positive and not to provide the goods
if the marginal profit is negative. Then, the monopolist optimally segments consumers into
those who use the service and those who are excluded from the service. This segmentation
is achieved by the uniform monopoly pricing on the good with highest quality.
Contrary to these research I show that even under the linear environment, price-
discrimination is optimal for the platform. Intuition behind this result is the following. In
two-sided markets, each customer has its “consumer value" that reflects the willingness to
pay for the service, and “input value" that reflects the profit from procuring the consumer
to list the advertisements. To exploit these values at the same time, the platform optimally
offers two services.
One exception which obtains a similar result is Jing (2007). He examines a linear
environment as specified in Salant (1989), except that there are direct network externalities.
He shows that, when there are network externalities, then it is optimal for the firm to offer
two products which consist of a good with lowest possible quality and with highest
possible quality. One difference between Jing (2007) and this paper is that, while he
considers the menu pricing with direct network externalities in one-sided markets, I
analyze the properties of optimal menu pricing inherent to the two-sidedness of markets.
This difference in environments leads to the different behavior of optimal menu pricing
and derives different implications.4
4Another technical difference is that, while Jing (2007) requires some exogenous bounds on the possible
4
Two-sided markets and advertising platforms My model is based on the framework
of two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006), Weyl (2010)).
There is a burgeoning literature on nonlinear-pricing or price discrimination in two-sided
markets (e.g., Bedre-Defolie andCalvano (2013), Choi et al. (2015), Jeon et al. (2016)). In
the sense that a platform uses transaction as an instrument to price-discriminate, the model
of Gomes and Pavan (2016) is the closest to mine. They consider a price-discrimination
by a many-to-many matching platform where each agent is characterized by vertical types.
They show the conditions under which the optimal mechanism will be a threshold rule and
analyze the properties of optimal mechanisms. In this respect, they treat the broader range
of environments than mine. On the other hand, by focusing on simpler environment, my
model provides a tractable setting which enables more detailed analyses on the properties
of optimal menu pricing, especially related to freemium. In addition, my result that
freemium is adopted by platforms is robust to the competition, which is not easy to show
in Gomes and Pavan’s mechanism design framework.
There is also a literature on the behavior of advertising platforms in the framework of
two-sided markets (e.g., Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2004), Anderson and Coate
(2005), Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006), Peitz and Valletti (2008)). Anderson and Coate
(2005) find that advertising platforms always underprovides advertisements in terms of
social welfare when they can charge prices to consumers. My result is consistent with their
result. The platform also underprovides advertisements under freemium. In addition, I
show that the amount of advertisements is larger and the number of consumers who view
advertisements is smaller under freemium than under ad-supported model. In this respect,
I show that freemium alleviates the underprovision of advertisements to consumers, while
it exacerbates the underprovision of consumers to advertisers.
Freemium The word freemium is disseminated by Anderson (2009). In the area of
management, Eisenmann et al. (2011) examine the Dropbox’s business model as a case
study of freemium business.
In economics, there are a few studies on freemium which focus on the role of combat-
ing piracies and exploiting network externalities (e.g., Halmenschlager and Waelbroeck
(2014), Nan et al. (2016)). There are few on freemium as a price discrimination by
two-sided platforms. One exception is Zennyo (2016). Using a similar approach, he
analyzes the behaviors of freemium pricing by duopoly advertising platforms. While his
main focus is on the behavior of equilibrium pricing given that platforms adopt freemium,
my focus is on the optimality of freemium in a broader class of selling procedures. My
result shows that freemium is also optimal price discrimination and an equilibrium price
discrimination. Thus, this paper contributes to the research on freemium pricing in a
different way.
qualities to derive the qualities of two goods, these bounds are endogenously determined by the platform
in two-sided markets. First, the platform cannot assign the amount of advertisements less than zero,
which gives the upper bound on the “quality" in my model. Second, the platform also cannot assign the
amount of advertisements more than the amount of advertisers who actually participate the platform,
which gives the lower bound on the quality. Finally, the amount of advertisers who participate is
determined by the platform. These factors endogenize the bound on possible qualities.
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2. Monopoly Menu Pricing
In this section, I present a model of monopoly menu pricing by an advertising platform.
I show that freemium, providing only two basic and premium services, is optimal menu
pricing for the platform. Then, I examine the behavior of the freemium pricing and its
welfare properties. Finally, I compare freemium with ad-supported business model.
2.1. Model
The model consists of three groups of agents: a monopolistic platform which operates
an advertising space, a unit mass of consumers, and a unit mass of advertisers who may
potentially participate in the platform. Main features of this model are that (i) a platform
can offer amenu of serviceswhich specify the intended amount of advertisements and fixed
fees, (ii) consumers derive utilities from an intrinsic value of services, but incur nuisance
cost from interactions with advertisers, and (iii) advertisers benefit from interactions with
consumers.
Platform The platform can offer a menu of services and an advertising space to potential
consumers and advertisers. A menu M ≡ (mk )Kk=0 ∈ R2(K+1)+ is a profile of (K + 1)
services. For each k = 0, 1, . . . K , the k-th service mk ≡ (ak, pk ) specifies a pair of an
intended amount of advertisers ak ∈ R+ on that service and a fixed fee pk ∈ R+ for using
the service. The restriction that pk ∈ R+ means that there is nonnegativity constraint in
the consumer price. The platform also charges per-transaction fees pa ∈ R to advertisers.
Figure 1 shows the flow of transactions.
Let a ∈ R+ be the total amount of advertisers who participate the platform and ak be
the actual amount of advertisers on k-th service. I assume that
ak = min{ak, a} for each k . (1)
This assumption means that the actual amount of advertisers ak who transact with con-
sumers on each service cannot exceed the total amount of advertisers a who participate
in the platform.5 If ak ≤ a, then the platform can assign the intended amount without
problems.
Let dk ∈ R+ denote the amount of consumerswho choosemk . The amount of transaction
under k-th service is given by dkak . Under this setting, the total amount of transaction T
is given by
T =
K∑
k=0
dkak .
The platform who offers M and pa earns revenue Π from (i) fixed fees for each services
from consumers, and (ii) transaction fees from advertisers, which can be expressed as
Π =
K∑
k=0
dkpk + Tpa =
K∑
k=0
dk (pk + akpa).
5This assumption corresponds to the reciprocity condition in the model of Gomes and Pavan (2016).
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Figure 1: Flow of Transactions
Consumers Consumers obtain an intrinsic value v ∈ R+ from participating in the
platform, which is independent of services chosen. For simplicity, I assume that v is the
same among consumers.
I also assume that consumers are annoyed by the presence of advertisements, and these
nuisance from advertisements are heterogeneous among consumers. In particular, each
consumer incurs a nuisance cost c˜ per transaction with advertisers, which is privately
known by the consumer and follows a strictly increasing, continuously differentiable
distribution function F on [0,C] with the density function f . I assume that F (c˜)f (c˜) is
increasing in c˜. The specification that consumer nuisance cost is linear in the amount
of advertisement is commonly adopted in the literature of advertising platforms (e.g.,
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006)) and I follow this convention.
Imposing the quasi-linearity assumption, the utility of consumer with type c˜ who
chooses k-th service can be expressed as v − c˜ak − pk .6 Normalizing the value of outside
option to zero, we can write the utility function of consumer with type c˜ as follows:
U (c˜) =
v − c˜ak − pk if mk is chosen,0 if none is chosen.
Finally, each consumer has a unit demand and chooses the alternative that gives the greatest
utility.
6This specification implicitly assumes that each consumer correctly forms the expectation over the realiza-
tion of ak .
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Advertisers Advertisers are heterogeneous in their per-transaction benefit b, which
reflects an expected profit from consumers they transact with, and is privately known by
the advertiser. I assume that b follows a strictly increasing, continuously differentiable
distribution function G on [0, B] with the density function g, and that 1−G(b)g(b) is decreasing
in b. For simplicity, I also assume that advertisers only differ in per-transaction benefits
and that there is no benefit from just participating in the platform.
Each advertiser is equally assigned with the advertisement spaces, which means that
each advertiser transacts with Ta consumers on average. Thus, given the total amount of
advertisers a, the total amount of transaction T , and the per-transaction fee pa, the payoff
of advertiser with type b is given by
(b − pa)Ta .7
We can see that an advertiser with type b participates the platform if and only if b ≥ pa.
Thus, the demand for the advertisement space is given by
a = 1 − G(pa). (2)
Note that, since G is strictly increasing, we can invert G and write pa as G−1(1 − a).
Timing Timing is as follows.
1. Platform chooses M and pa.
2. Observing M and pa, advertisers decide whether to participate in the platform. At
the same time, consumers decide which service to choose or not to participate in
the platform, following the correct expectation on the amount of advertisers.
3. All outcomes realize.
2.2. Profit Maximization
Given the setting in the previous subsection, consider the profit maximization problem of
the platform.
First, note that the choice variables ak for k = 0, . . . , K and constraint (1) can be
replaced by ak for k = 0, . . . , K and the constraint
ak ≤ a for each k = 0, . . . , K, (3)
7This is a natural extension of standard two-sided markets literature. For example, in the model of Rochet
and Tirole (2003), the amount of transaction T between the amount d of consumers and the amount a of
advertisers is given by
T = da.
In this case, the benefit function of advertisers in my model can be written as
(b − pa)Ta = (b − pa)d,
which is the same as the benefit function presented in Rochet and Tirole (2003).
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since the platform can realize any ak ≤ a by choosing the same value of ak . Hence, I
consider the platform’s problem as the choice of (ak, pk )Kk=0 instead of (ak, pk )
K
k=0.
Next, without loss of generality, assume that a0 ≤ a1 ≤ · · · ≤ aK and that p0 ≥ p1 ≥
· · · ≥ pK .8 Also, without loss of generality, assume that p0 ≤ v so that m0 is chosen
by positive mass of consumers.9 Then let c0 be the type who is indifferent between m0
and not buying, and let ck be the type which is indifferent between mk and mk−1 for each
k = 1, . . . , K . To break ties, I assume that each consumer with type ck choose mk rather
than mk−1. Then, we can see that
c0 =
v − p0
a0
and ck =
pk−1 − pk
ak − ak−1 for k = 1, . . . , K if a0 > 0
c1 =
p0 − p1
a1
and ck =
pk−1 − pk
ak − ak−1 for k = 2, . . . , K if a0 = 0,
(4)
and that consumers with type c˜ ∈ (ck+1, ck] chooses mk . In the case where a0 = 0, all
types c˜ ∈ [0, c0] will choose m0 as long as p0 ≤ v. Thus, the demand for each service is
given bydk = F (ck ) − F (ck+1) for k = 0, . . . , K − 1, and dK = F (cK ) if a0 > 0d0 = 1 − F (c1), dk = F (ck ) − F (ck+1) for k = 1, . . . K − 1, and dK = F (cK ) if a0 = 0.
(5)
Putting these elements together, the profit maximization problem of the platform can
be expressed as
max
(ak,pk )Kk=0
K∑
k=0
dk (pk + akpa)
s.t. (2), (3), (4), and (5).
(6)
Then consider the solution to the maximization problem above. I say a menu M is
binary if it consists of only two services. In this case, M can be expressed as M =
(mB,mP) ≡ ((aB, pB), (aP, pP)) with aB > aP and pB < pP. I call the service with lower
price mB = (aB, aB) as basic service and the service with higher price mP = (aP, pP) as
premium service. In addition, I say a binary menu (mB,mP) is freemium if pB = 0, that
is, the price of the basic service is zero. Let c be the type of consumer who is indifferent
between basic service and premium service. The following proposition states the main
result that the profit-maximizing menu is binary and satisfies certain properties.
Proposition 2.1. Optimal menu is binary, that is, the platform offers only two services at
the optimum. In particular, the profit-maximizingmenu is of the form ((aB, pB), (aP, pP)) =
((a, p), (0, v)), and in the case of interior solution, c and pa are determined by the following
equations:
pa = c +
F (c)
f (c)
, (7)
c = pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
. (8)
8Further assuming that p0 ≥ p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pK is without loss of generality since if pk < pk+1 hold some k,
then no consumer chooses mk+1 since mk gives strictly greater utility for any consumer.
9If p0 > v and p1 ≤ v we can induce the same demand by reintroducing the menu (m′k )Ki=0 such that
m′
k
= mk−1 for k = 1, . . . , K and m′K = mK .
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Proof. In Appendix. 
The intuition behind this result is the following. When consumer nuisance costs are
linear in the amount of advertisements, it is always optimal for the platform to either
increase or decrease the amount of advertisements to each consumer as long as possible.
Thus, for any k-th intermediate service, the amount of advertisement will be equal to
one of adjacent service. As a results, only two services with full advertisements and
no advertisements remains. Moreover, once we accept that the platform only offer two
services, it follows that the platform equates the marginal revenue and marginal cost of
increasing an agents on one side who interacts with the agents on the other side. These
incentives yield the equations (7) and (8). These equations are familiar in the literature
of two-sided markets which states that platforms equate the sum of transaction prices and
price semi-elasticity of demand of each side (e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2003)). In other
words, provided that the freemium is optimal, its behavior is fairly standard two-sided
pricing.
This intuition can be stated in another way. Consider the situation where the platform
chooses the amount of advertisement a(c˜) for each consumer with type c˜. We can interpret
c˜ + F (c˜)f (c˜) as the virtual marginal cost of listing an advertisement to consumer with type
c˜, in the sense that the platform need to pay that amount to induce the consumer to view
that advertisement (see Myerson (1981)). On the other hand, marginal revenue from
listing an advertisement to consumer is the per-transaction fee pa from the advertiser.
When nuisance costs are linear, these marginal cost and marginal revenue are constant in
a(c˜) and thus it is optimal to increase (decrease) a(c˜) as much as possible if marginal
revenue pa exceeds (falls below) the virtual marginal cost c˜ + F (c˜)f (c˜) . This means that the
optimal amount of advertisement a(c˜) for the consumer with type c˜ greater (smaller) than
threshold c˜ given by the equation (7) will be 0 (a). In determining the threshold type pa
of advertisers, the platform equates the marginal revenue from increasing an amount of
advertisers pa − 1−G(pa)g(pa) and the cost c of keeping the consumer demand unchanged. This
yields the equation (8).
I have shown that the optimal menu pricing is binary. However, this menu pricing is
not precisely the same as the freemium in the real world, since the basic goods might
not be free. Then we can ask when does the optimal menu pricing corresponds with the
freemium. In other words, the question is when p = 0 holds at the optimum. The answer
is that, when the benefit of advertisers from transaction is sufficiently large relative to the
intrinsic value of services, then p = 0 is optimal for the platform.
From the equation (8) and the nonnegative price constraint for p, we can see that if
v ≤ (1 − G(pa))
(
pa − 1−G(pa)g(pa)
)
, then p = 0, since
p = v − (1 − G(pa))
(
pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
)
must hold in the interior solution, which is negative and violates the nonnegative price
constraint. That is, consumers who use the basic service need not to pay anything if
the benefits of advertisers from listing advertisements are sufficiently large relative to the
intrinsic value consumers derive from the platform. This is the common property which
is observed in the models of two-sided markets. We can also see this inequality as the
condition under which freemium in the literal sense (p = 0) is optimal. Then, because the
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platform cannot adjust the price p below zero under the nonnegative price constraint, its
behavior slightly changes. The next result shows this property.
Proposition 2.2. If v ≤ (1 − G(pa))
(
pa − 1−G(pa)g(pa)
)
holds at the optimum, the optimal
menu is freemium. In addition, c and pa are determined by the equation
c =
v
1 − G(pa) (9)
ηc(c)(pa − c) = pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
, (10)
where ηc(c) ≡ cF (c) f (c) is the nuisance elasticity of demand for basic service.
This equation can be rewritten as follows:
∂c
∂a
1
c
f (c)c
F (c)
(v − apa) = pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
(11)
The left-hand side is the cost of increasing the amount of advertisers: the product of the
percentage change in threshold type due to the increase in the amount of advertisers, surplus
elasticity of demand, and the per-consumer revenue net of opportunity cost of losing
premium consumers. The right-hand side is the simple marginal revenue of increasing the
amount of advertisements. These cost and benefit equate at the optimum.
This result is analogous to Gomes (2014). When the platform can use a side payment
to adjust consumers’ incentive, the platform just maximize the total virtual value from
consumers and advertisers. On the other hand, when the platform cannot use a side
payment due to the nonnegative constraint of fixed fees, the platform need to care about
the demand elasticity of increasing the amount of advertisements.
Going back to the interior solution, the next result shows simple comparative statics
of the behavior of freemium pricing. Roughly speaking, these results state that if either
consumers’ nuisance costs are more likely to be high, or advertisers’ benefit is more likely
to be high, then both of threshold types c and pa will be higher.
Result 2.1. The following comparative statics results hold.
1. If the distribution functionF is replaced by a distribution function F˜ which dominates
F according to reverse hazard rate,10 both c and pa increase.
2. Suppose the distribution function G(b) has an inverse hazard rate function λ(θ, b)
which is continuously differentiable, increasing in the first argument θ, and decreas-
ing in the second argument b. Then pa and c are increasing in θ.
Proof. In Appendix. 
The first part of comparative statics is straightforward. The reverse hazard rate domi-
nance implies that the consumer nuisance cost is more likely to be high. Then the platform
decreases the amount of advertisements which is shown to the consumers, which leads to
the increase in the threshold type c and pa. Technically, the reverse hazard rate dominance
10A distribution function F˜ dominates another distribution function F according to reverse hazard rate if
for any c˜ ∈ [0,C], f˜ (c˜)
F˜ (c˜)
≥ f (c˜)F (c˜) holds.
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implies that the lower virtual marginal cost of listing an advertisement to each consumer.
Then by equation (7), for a given amount of advertisements, threshold type of consumer
will be higher. Next, if the threshold type of consumer will be higher, then the virtual
value of marginal advertiser will be higher by equation (8). These facts lead to the increase
in c and pa.
The effects of change in the distribution G of advertisers’ types are not so clear. By
equation (7) we can see that threshold types pa and cmoves in the same direction regardless
of the type of exogenous shock, but the direction in which these thresholds move is unclear.
However, parameterizing the distribution functions G by the inverse hazard rate function
λ(θ, b), optimal values of pa and c turn out to be increasing in θ.
2.3. Welfare Analysis
Consider the socially optimalmenu pricing and the divergence between the social optimum
and profit maximizing menu. I restrict the attention to the set of menus which contains
two elements (0, v) and (a, p). Actually, it can be shown that this class of menus are
welfare-maximizing using the same logic as in the Proposition 2.1.
Result 2.2. The socially optimal menu is binary.
Proof. In Appendix. 
Thus, I focus on the binary menu.
First, consider the utility of consumers. Consumer who chooses (0, v) obtains 0 utility.
On the other hand, the consume who chooses (a, p) obtains the utility v− c˜a−p. Summing
these up over consumers, the consumer surplus CS is obtained as
CS =
∫ c
0
(v − c˜a − p) f (c˜)dc˜
= F (c)(1 − G(pa))(c − cˆ),
(12)
where cˆ = E[c˜|c˜ ≤ c] is the average disutility of consumers who choose the service with
advertisements. On the other hand, the advertiser surplus AS is given by
AS = F (c)
∫ B
pa
(b − pa)g(b)db
= F (c)(1 − G(pa))(bˆ − pa),
(13)
where bˆ = E[b|b ≥ pa] is the average benefit of advertisers who participate the platform.
Summing these and the platform’s profit up, the total surplus TS is given by
TS = CS + AS + Π = v +
∫ c
0
(∫ B
pa
bg(b)db − c˜a
)
f (c˜)dc˜
= v + F (c)(1 − G(pa))(bˆ − cˆ).
(14)
We can see that the total surplus depends only on c and pa. Thus, it suffices to consider the
socially optimal values of c and pa.11 Taking derivatives with respect to c and pa, we can
11Actually, any c can be chosen by the platform by choosing an appropriate value of p.
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obtain the welfare-maximizing pricing, which is determined by the following equations:
c = bˆ and pa = cˆ. (15)
This means that the threshold type of one side equals the average type of the other side
who interacts. The next proposition is a natural consequence of Spence (1975) and Weyl
(2010); Besides the market power, the profit-maximizing behaviors deviate from the social
optimum to the extent that their effects on the marginal agent and average agent diverge.
Following Weyl (2010), I call this divergence as Spence distortion.
Proposition 2.3. Under the profit-maximizing pricing, the following equations for thresh-
old types c and pa hold:
c = bˆ︸︷︷︸
Social optimum
+ (pa − bˆ)︸   ︷︷   ︸
Spence distortion
− F (c)
f (c)︸︷︷︸
market power distortion
(16)
pa = cˆ︸︷︷︸
Social optimum
+ (c − cˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spence distortion
+
1 − G(pa)
g(pa)︸      ︷︷      ︸
market power distortion
(17)
Profit-maximizing price for advertisers is too high and the amount of consumers who view
advertisements is too small in terms of social welfare. In total, the amount of transaction
is insufficient.
In other words, profit-maximizing size of network is too small in terms of social welfare,
because both the amount of consumers who choose the service with advertisement and
the amount of advertisers who participate the platform is too small. In relation to the
literature, I confirm that the result of Anderson and Coate (2005) that profit-maximizing
amount of advertisements is too small in terms of social welfare remains to hold even
under freemium.
2.4. Comparison between Business Models
It is interesting to compare properties of binary menu pricing with those of ad-supported
business model since these business models are both prevalent in real world and their
difference in revenue structures might lead to different behaviors. I say a menu is ad-
supported if it consists of only one service (a, p). Then, the pricing problem of the
platform which adopts ad-supported menu is given by
max
a,p
F
(
v − p
a
)
(p + aG−1(1 − a)). (18)
Deriving the first-order conditions, we can see the following result.
Proposition 2.4. Under the ad-supported businessmodel, the optimal prices for consumers
and advertisers are determined by the equations
pa = c +
F (c)
f (c)
− v
a
, (19)
c = pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
. (20)
In addition, pa, and c are higher than under freemium.
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Proof. In Appendix. 
This result implies that the amount of advertisers is lower and the amount of consumers
who view advertisements are higher under ad-supported business than under freemium.
Together with the Proposition 2.3., we can see that freemium alleviates the incentive of
platforms to under-provide advertisements relative to ad-supported business but exacer-
bates the incentive to under-provide consumers who view advertisements. This result
comes from the fact that the platform cannot collect revenues from consumers who do
not want to view advertisements under the ad-supported business model. Platforms which
adopt freemium can collect revenues from consumers who avoid advertisements. This
changes incentives of platforms in the way that more consumers pay to avoid advertise-
ments, exacerbating the underprovision of consumers who view advertisements. On the
other hand, this underprovision of consumers decreases the type c of threshold consumer,
which implies that the type pa of threshold advertiser also decreases. This means that the
amount of advertisements will be higher, alleviating the underprovision of advertisements.
2.5. Discussions
In this subsection, I discuss several aspects of monopoly menu pricing which are not
treated in the model above.
Heterogeneous Intrinsic Value It seems restrictive that consumer intrinsic value from
participating the platform is constant at v. Nevertheless, we can see that the qualitative
result will not change even if this assumption is relaxed.
Suppose that v follows a strictly increasing, continuously differentiable distribution
function H on [0,V ] with density h, and 1−H (v)h(v) being decreasing in v. Setting the profit-
maximization problem and deriving the first-order conditions for pk , k = 1, . . . , K − 1
accordingly, we can obtain∫ ck
ck+1
(1 − H (cak + pk )) f (c˜)dc˜ −
∫ ck
ck+1
h(c˜ak + pk ) f (c˜)dc(pk + akG−1(1 − a))
+ (1 − H (ckak + pk )) f (ck )(ck − G−1(1 − a))
− (1 − H (ck+1ak + pk )) f (ck+1)(ck+1 − G−1(1 − a)) = 0.
(21)
This has a solution ck = ck+1. Thus, the similar result is observed.12
Linearity of Nuisance Costs Parts of my results depend crucially on the linearity of
the environment. If the nuisance cost is convex in the amount of advertisements, it is
optimal for the platform to offer a nonlinear schedule of advertisement-price pairs. The
linearity assumption requires that the consumer nuisance from an additional advertisement
is constant. Casually speaking, this assumption seems to hold in the cases where the
amount of advertisements shown to consumers is not large. On the contrary, when the
amount of advertisements is too large, these advertisements crowd out the original contents
which the platform offers, generating the higher marginal nuisance from advertisements.
However, if there is so large amount of advertisements that the advertisements crowd out
12The detail is available upon request.
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the original contents, then the platform is likely to fail to attract consumers. Whether the
reality can be approximated by the linear environment is rather an empirical issue.
Menu Pricing on Advertisers’ Side So far, I have considered the situation where the
platform engages in menu pricing only on the consumers’ side. Even if we take the menu
pricing on advertisers’ side into account, the result does not change. Consider the situation
where the platform’s menu consists of M ≡ (M, M˜), where the menu M˜ = (m˜l )Ll=0 for
advertisers consists of L + 1 services ml = (xl, tl ). xl is the amount of consumers the
advertisers can reach and tl is the fixed payment that the advertiser must make. Let yl be
the amount of advertisers who choose the service m˜l . I impose the feasibility restriction
that
K∑
k=0
dkak =
L∑
l=0
yl xl .
With this specification, it can be shown that the optimal menu pricing is the same as that
presented in the previous subsections.13
In this respect, the assumption that the platform only charges transaction price on the
advertisers’ side is without loss of generality in this model.
Interdependence between Consumers’ and Advertisers’ Types It may be more plau-
sible to allow for the interdependence between the nuisance cost of consumers and trans-
action benefit of advertisers. For example, if nuisance cost reflects the opportunity cost of
time, and the consumer with higher income has the higher opportunity cost of time, then
the transaction benefit of advertiser may be higher when it transacts with a consumer with
higher nuisance cost. On the other hand, it may be the case that the consumer with little
interest to the advertisers has a higher nuisance cost. In this case, there is the negative
relation between nuisance costs and transaction benefits. The condition under which my
result remains to hold in such situations is left for a future research.
3. Duopoly Menu Competition
In this section, I extend the model to duopoly competition. The qualitative result that the
equilibrium menu pricing or optimal monopolistic menu pricing should be binary remains
to be valid.
Consider a duopoly case of the previous section. I adopt a Hotelling specification.
There are two platforms i = 1, 2 located on the edges of a unit interval, and consumers are
uniformly distributed on that interval. Let Mi = (mki)Kk=0 be menu that platform i offers.
I assume that advertisers multihome so that there is no competition between platforms for
advertisers. Consumer’s utility from participating the platform i’s service is given by
Ui (c˜, x) =
v − c˜aki − pki − t |1i=2 − x | if mki is chosen0 if none is chosen, (22)
where x is the location on the unit interval [0, 1], and 1i=2 is the indicator function which
takes 1 if i = 2.
13The detail is available upon request.
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Each consumer with type (c˜, x) chooses the utility-maximizing services among the
menus of two platforms, or chooses to buy nothing.
As in the previous section, suppose aki ≤ ak+1i and pki ≥ pk+1i for each k = 0, . . . , K−1
and i = 1, 2.
In general, there might be numerous patterns of menus for a platform which will be a
best response to a menu of the other platform. Although it is interesting, it is not easy
to figure out these general patterns of Nash equilibrium pair of menus. Thus, I restrict
an attention to the symmetric equilibrium, where M1 = M2 = M = (mk )Kk=0. In this
simplified case, we can see that ck1 = ck2 = ck for each k, where cki is the type a consumer
who is indifferent between mki and mk−1i.
Suppose (mk )Kk=0 is the symmetric equilibrium menu. For simplicity, I assume that v is
sufficiently large relative toC and t, so that in any equilibrium any consumer chooses some
service. I also assume that the second-order condition for the equilibrium menu pricing
is satisfied14 Under the setting described above, I obtain the following result which shows
that binary menu remains to be an equilibrium even if we take competition into account.
Proposition 3.1. The symmetric equilibrium menu is binary. The symmetric equilibrium
binary menu is of the form (a, t − apa), (0, t), and the price for advertisers are determined
by the following equations:
c = bˆ︸︷︷︸
Social optimum
+ (pa − bˆ)︸   ︷︷   ︸
Spence distortion
(23)
pa = cˆ︸︷︷︸
Social optimum
+
1 − G(pa)
g(pa)︸      ︷︷      ︸
Market power distortion
(24)
where cˆ ≡ E[c˜|c˜ ≤ c] is the average type of consumers who choose basic good.
Proof. In Appendix. 
Compared to the first-order condition in the monopoly case, we can see that there is no
distortion on the consumer side. This effect is driven by the introduction of competition.
As in Armstrong and Vickers (2010), when platforms compete in menu pricing, they offer
the first-best contracts, and try to compete in fixed prices. These effects eliminate the
distortion on the consumer side. By contrast, since each platform retains market power on
advertisers’ side, the distortion on that side still remains.
Through the derivation of the expressions in Proposition 3.1., I find the condition on
which the freemium is the equilibrium menu. This condition is similar to that found in
Result 2.1.
Corollary 3.1. If the solution to the equations (22) and (23) satisfies the inequality apa ≥ t,
the equilibrium menu is freemium.
14I do not derive the second-order condition but just assume that the second-order condition is satisfied
since it is not the main focus of this paper. Zennyo (2016) derives the second-order condition under a
similar specification to my model.
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As in the monopoly case, the binary menu becomes freemium if the willingness to pay
of advertisers is sufficiently high.
As another corollary of the proposition above, I find that the equilibrium profit is
independent of any fundamentals of consumers or advertisers.
Corollary 3.2. In the symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium profit for each firm is t2 .
This result is somewhat striking because all the benefits for platforms from adopting
binary menu disappears once a competition is introduced. This property is known as
revenue neutrality property that if all consumers are served, then any exogenous increase in
revenues per consumers are competed away (Anderson and Gabszewicz 2006, Armstrong
2006).
As seen above, the main property that the platform segment consumers into those
who view fewer advertisements and those who view all advertisements holds even under
duopoly. This result indicates the robustness of binary pricing in different situations.
In addition, as seen in the Result 2.1., I conjecture that the equilibrium menu would be
freemium if the benefit of advertisers from interaction with consumers is sufficiently high.
4. Conclusion
Freemium with advertisement is so prevalent that any people who have ever used online
applications have faced a choice between free service with a lot of advertisements and
ad-free premium service. I examine the optimality of this business model, and show
that under certain specifications which are naturally adopted in the literature of two-sided
markets, freemium with advertisements is actually the best way to collect revenues from
both consumer and advertisers. The property that at the optimal nonlinear pricing, there
are two bunches of consumers at the top and at the bottom seems to be robust to several
modifications of specifications.
One possible direction of future research is the analysis of a platform who uses quality
and advertisements as instruments of price discrimination at the same time. In reality,
platforms use not only the amount of advertisements but also the qualities of services as
instruments of price discrimination. There might be an interesting interaction when we
analyze these things together. In addition, there might be heterogeneity in the externality
of each agent in one side on agents on another side, as in Gomes and Pavan (2016) and
Jeon et al. (2016). Incorporating these elements may make other differences, such as
complementarities or substitutabilities in quality and the amount of advertisements. Also,
analyzing asymmetric equilibria under duopoly menu competition might be interesting
since in the real world, different business models coexist and this cannot be explained by
my simple model. However, just computing asymmetric equilibria using my model ends
up being a tedious calculation without meaningful results. Thus, one have to invent more
tractable framework to tackle with this problem.
A. Appendix: Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1
I introduce several lemmata and use them to prove the proposition.
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Lemma A.1. Optimal menu pricing satisfies a0 = 0, p0 = v.
Proof. Let (mk )Kk=0 be an optimal menu and suppose that a0 > 0. By the first-order
condition for pk , k = 1, . . . , K − 1, we have ck = ck+1 for k = 1, . . . , K − 1. In this case,
the profit can be written as
d0p0 + dKpK + (d0a0 + dKaK )G−1(1 − a)).
Consider a menu (m′k )
K
k=0 such that
a′0 = 0, p
′
0 = v
a′1 = a0, p
′
1 = p0
a′k = ak, p
′
k = pk for k = 2, . . . , K .
We can see that this menu obtains the profit
d0p0 + dKpK + (d0a0 + dKaK )G−1(1 − a) + (1 − F (c0))v,
which is higher than the profit obtained by (mk )Kk=0, violating the optimality. Thus, we
must have a0 = 0.
Next, suppose that (mk )Kk=0 satisfies a0 = 0 but p0 < v. In this case, c1 =
p0−p1
a1
. Then
increasing pk by small ε for all k does not change ck for all k. Thus, this price change
increases the profit by
∑K
k=0 dkε > 0. This contradicts the optimality of (mk )
K
k=1. Thus,
we must have p0 = v. 
Lemma A.2. Optimal menu pricing satisfies c1 = · · · = cK .
Proof. By the proof of Lemma A.1, we can see that c1 = v−p1a1 . I next show that c2 = · · · =
cK . Consider the first-order condition for pk for k = 2, . . . , K − 1:
∂dk−1
∂pk
(pk−1+ak−1G−1(1−a))+∂dk
∂pk
(pk+akG−1(1−a))+∂dk+1
∂pk+1
(pk+1+ak+1G−1(1−a))+dk = 0.
This equation can be rewritten as
f (ck )(ck − G−1(1 − a)) + F (ck ) = f (ck+1)(ck+1 − G−1(1 − a)) + F (ck+1),
which has the solution ck = ck+1.
Finally, I show that c1 = c2. The first-order condition for p1 is given by
∂d0
∂p1
(p0 + a0G−1(1− a)) + ∂d1
∂p1
(p1 + a1G−1(1− a)) + ∂d2
∂p1
(p2 + a2G−1(1− a)) + d1 = 0.
This equation can be rewritten as
f (c1)(c1 − G−1(1 − a)) + F (c1) = f (c2)(c2 − G−1(1 − a)) + F (c2),
and c1 = c2 satisfies this condition. These imply that c1 = . . . , cK . 
Lemma A.3. Optimal menu pricing satisfies aK = a
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Proof. By Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, the profit maximization problem is reduced to
max
aK,a,p
Π = (1 − F (c))v + F (c)(p + aKG−1(1 − a))
s.t. c =
v − p
aK
aK ≤ a.
In this case, as long as aK < a, the platform can increase the profit by reducing a. Thus,
aK = a. 
Summarizing these lemmata, we obtain the first statement.
Next, the profit maximization problem (6) can be rewritten as
max
a,p
(1 − F (c))v + F (c)(p + aG−1(1 − a))
s.t. c =
v − p
a
.
(25)
Proof. The first-order condition for p is given by
f (c)(c − G−1(1 − a)) + F (c) = 0.
Rearranging this equation, we obtain
pa − c = F (c)f (c) .
The first-order condition for a is given by
c f (c)(c − G−1(1 − a)) + F (c)(G−1(1 − a) − aG−1′ (1 − a)) = 0.
Applying the inverse function theorem, substituting the first-order condition for p, and
rearranging, we obtain
pa − c = 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
.
Finally, we can see that the second-order condition is satisfied when Ff is increasing and
1−G
g is decreasing.
Putting these together, we obtain the Proposition 2.1. 
A.2. Proof of Result 2.2
Proof. First, consider the case where F is replaced by F˜ which dominates F according
to reverse hazard rate. Then, we have F˜ (c˜)
f˜ (c˜)
≤ F (c˜)f (c˜) for any c˜ ∈ [0,C]. Let c′ and p′a be
the threshold types under F˜ and c and pa be the threshold types under F. I first show that
p′a ≥ pa. Suppose that pa > p′a. Then
c = pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
> p′a −
1 − G(p′a)
g(p′a)
= c′.
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Combining equations (7) and (8), we obtain
1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
=
F (c)
f (c)
, and
1 − G(p′a)
g(p′a)
=
F˜ (c′)
f˜ (c′)
.
Putting these together, we obtain
1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
=
F (c)
f (c)
≥ F (c
′)
f (c′)
≥ F˜ (c
′)
f˜ (c′)
=
1 − G(p′a)
g(p′a)
,
which leads to pa ≤ p′a since 1−Gg is decreasing and derives contradiction. Thus, we have
p′a ≥ pa and c′ ≥ c follows.
Next, I show that pa and c are increasing in θ in the second case. If the inverse hazard
rate is characterized by λ(θ, b), then the first-order conditions can be written as
c +
F (c)
f (c)
− pa = 0
pa − λ(θ, pa) − c = 0.
Differentiating these equations by θ and rearranging, we can see that
dpa
dθ
=
− ∂λ(θ,pa)∂θ ∂∂c
(
c + F (c)f (c)
)
(
1 − ∂∂pa
(
pa − λ(θ, pa)) ∂∂c (c + F (c)f (c) )) ≥ 0
Thus, pa is increasing in θ. Then the fact that c is increasing in θ is straightforward.

A.3. Proof of Result 2.3
Proof. First, note that the socially optimal menu must satisfy a0 = 0 and p0 ≤ v. If
a0 > 0, then there is a positive mass of consumers who do not participate in the platform
(i.e., c˜ > c0.). In this case, by introducing a new service m′ with a′ = 0 and p′ = v, the
welfare can be improved by the amount of such consumers times the intrinsic value of the
content, (1 − F (c0))v.
Given the menu M with a0 = 0 and p0 ≤ v, the total surplus is given by
v −
K∑
k=1
∫ ck
ck+1
ak c˜ f (c˜)dc˜ +
K∑
k=1
dk
∫ B
pa
b
a
g(b)db
=v +
K∑
k=1
∫ ck
ck+1
(
bˆ − c˜
)
f (c˜)dc˜
(26)
where bˆ = E[b|b ≥ pa]. Then the first-order condition for pk , k = 2, . . . , K − 1 can be
writtens as
−(bˆ − ck ) f (ck ) + (bˆ − ck+1) f (ck+1) = 0, (27)
which has a solution ck = ck+1 for k = 2, . . . , K − 1. Thus, c2 = . . . , cK . It remains to
show that c1 = c2. The first-order condition for p1 can also be written as
(c1 − bˆ) f (c1) − (c2 − bˆ) f (c2) = 0,
which has the solution c1 = c2. Thus, we have c1 = . . . , c2. This shows that the socially
optimal menu pricing is binary. 
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. Let c′ and p′a be the threshold types under ad-supported model and c and pa be
the threshold under binary menu. Suppose that c′ < c. Then p′a < pa is also follows from
the equation (8) and the equation (19). Combining the first-order condition under each
business model and assumption above, we obtain
1 − G(p′a)
g(p′a)
<
F (c′)
f (c′)
≤ F (c)
f (c)
=
1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
.
Thie inequality requires p′a > pa to hold, which contradicts p′a < pa. Thus, we must have
c′ ≥ c and p′a ≥ pa. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Suppose that platform 2 offers the binary menu described in Proposition 3.1. I
argue that the best response of platform 1 is to adopt the same menu.15
Suppose that 1 can observe c˜ (but not x). I calculate 1’s best response to 2 given c˜. Let
V1 = max
mk1
v − ak1c˜ − pk1
be the type-c˜ consumer’s gross utility when she buys from platform 1 and 2, respectively.
The most profitable way to generate utility V1 is
max
p′,a′
p′ + a′G−1(1 − a)
s.t. v − a′c˜ − p′ = V1,
a′ ≤ a.
This problem has a solution
a(c˜) =
a if c˜ ≤ G
−1(1 − a)
0 otherwise.
From this, we can see that (i) platform offers two services with (0, pP) and (a, pB), and
(ii) the threshold type c is determined by c = G−1(1 − a) = pa. These implies
c =
pP − pB
a
= pa =⇒ pP = pB + apa .
Putting these together, the equilibrium menu becomes (a, pB), (0, pB + apa).
Next, I consider the remaining equilibrium values of a and pB. Suppose that platform
1 slightly increases pB by  . Then, given type c˜ below pa, the threshold location xˆ(c˜) is
determined by
xˆ(c˜) =
1
2
− 
2t
.
For type c˜ below, the threshold location is given by
xˆ =
1
2
− 
2t
15This proof is almost the copy of Armstrong and Vickers (2010).
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Then the profit of platform 1 can be written as(
1
2
− 
2t
)
(pB +  + apa).
Then, the equilibrium condition is that the first-order condition is satisfied at  = 0:
pB + apa = t.
Next, suppose that platform 1 slightly increases a by ε. First, the threshold nuisance cost
changes from pa toG−1(1−a−ε). Next, the threshold location for c˜ belowG−1(1−a−ε)
is given by
x′(c˜) =
1
2
− c˜ε
2t
.
For c˜ ∈ [G−1(1 − a − ε), pa], the threshold type is
x′′(c˜) =
1
2
− (a + ε)G
−1(1 − a − ε) − c˜a
2t
.
For c˜ ≥ pa, the threshold location becomes
x′′′ =
1
2
− (a + ε)G
−1(1 − a − ε) − apa
2t
.
Putting these together, the profit of platform 1 is
*,(1 − F (pa))x′′′ +
∫ pa
G−1(1−a−ε)
x′′(c) f (c˜)dc˜ +
∫ G−1(1−a−ε)
0
x′(c˜) f (c˜)dc˜+- (pB+(a+ε)G−1(1−a−ε)).
The first-order condition is then(
−pa − aG
−1′ (1 − a)
2t
(1 − F (pa)) −
∫ pa
0
c˜
2t
f (c˜)dc˜
)
(pB+apa)+
1
2
(
pa − aG−1′ (1 − a)
)
= 0
=⇒ pa − 1 − G(pa)
g(pa)
= cˆ.
Putting them together, I obtain equations (22) and (23). 
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